STATEMENT
Of
Capt. Donald D. STEVENS
23 August 1967
[The following is a
verbatim transcription of the official statement of Donald STEVENS who
controlled the air strikes that followed PLESS’s rescue of three of the
four men. This report was included in the Medal of Honor recommendation
to document the overwhelming strength of the
enemy that was entrenched in the immediate vicinity of the rescue.
Paragraph breaks, italics and bold text have been added for readability.
Editorial comments are in square brackets ….Editor]
On 19 August 1967, I was scrambled
from Quang Ngai airfield. Upon getting airborne, I was advised by my
ground control station that a helicopter (believed to be a CH-47) had
received enemy fire and made a forced landing on the beach at
coordinates BS743796.
When I arrived over the scene, an Army
O-1 aircraft (call sign – Cat Killer 39) was directing a flight of F-100
aircraft against targets in the area. Since he was not a qualified FAC,
he turned the air strike control over to me. I am a USAF FAC assigned to
the 2nd ROKMC Brigade and fly under the call sign of Togo 87.
When I assumed control of the flight of F-100’s, Cat Killer 39 told me
that the helicopter had received extremely intense enemy fire after
setting down and had managed to take off again but left four people (his
crew chief and three passengers) on the ground. Three of these people
were picked up by a US Marine Armed UH1E piloted by Capt. Steve PLESS.
During their pickup they received very heavy automatic weapons fire, small
arms fire, and attack by numerous enemy at close range throwing hand
grenades.
The fourth person was reported as a
confirmed KIA. I could see the one body lying on the beach. I continued
controlling the F-100’s and followed this attack by controlling five other
flights of U.S. Marine fighters and several US Army helicopter gunships.
I could see five areas from which
intense automatic weapons fire and anti-aircraft fire consistently came
during each fighter pass. These positions were all within 200 meters of
the body on the beach and one position was only about 40 meters away.
These positions were the targets of my air strikes. Throughout our
attacks, we received intense ground fire. In my nine months in
Vietnam as a FAC, I have never seen more intense ground fire.
As a result of the air strikes by the
fixed wing aircraft, armed gunships, and the attack made by Capt. PLESS’
armed UH1E, there were three automatic weapons positions neutralized and
over 50 enemy KBA [killed by air] confirmed by my body count.
A U.S. Army command and control
helicopter (call sign Rattler 03) arrived on the scene and asked me if I
felt it was feasible to airlift a reaction force into the area. I
informed him that only one body remained and that intense enemy fire still
existed. He decided to try to put in the reaction force. Within 15
minutes the reaction force was inserted and the man on the beach was
extracted. After the helicopters refueled, the reaction force was
extracted.
The reaction force had never advanced beyond the
beach because of strong enemy resistance. Continued heavy ground fire was
encountered throughout the helilift in spite of heavy suppressive fire
laid down by six accompanying armed helicopter gunships. During the
insertion, Rattler 03 reported counting ten separate automatic weapons
positions in action. The lead helicopter in the lift operation reported
twelve positions in action during one pass over the area. The reaction
force was extracted just as it began getting dark.
I continued to direct another air
strike against the area in spite of heavy thunderstorms moving into the
area. When the weather became too low, a 500 foot ceiling with one mile
visibility, I discontinued the air strike and returned to Quang Ngai to
land.
Donald D. STEVENS, Capt, USAF
FR59395, 20th TAC Air Support Squadron.
